Kangaroo Island Plantations (KPT)

KPT has been a phenomenal investment, a great investing lesson and if plans materialise will be a positive economic boost for Kangaroo Island and South Australia. 

Kangaroo Island (KI) is located in South Australia (130km south of Adelaide) and is famous for its ecotourism including Seal Bay, marine life and a quiet get-away retreat. The tourism hot spots are located on the far western, southern and eastern sides of the island with the central and northern side typically used for agriculture. KI is quite big: 155km wide and 55km long and at times it actually feels quite remote driving through the centre. The population of over 4,000 (2006) is located mostly on the eastern side around the towns of Penneshaw and Kingscote. Sealink provides the ferry from Penneshaw to the mainland at Fleurieu Peninsula.  

It also turns out that KI has exceptional growing conditions for timber. A high, consistent rainfall combined with mild summers and low salinity allow timber to grow quickly. The faster you can grow timber, the cheaper it is to produce and KI finds itself among the lower costs timber producers in the country.

During the timber Managed Investment Scheme (MIS) heyday, various timber companies bought lots of land on KI and around the country and planted timber. These were tax and commission motivated structures that ultimately failed and the likes of Great Southern Plantations and Gunns went bankrupt. 

The main problem unique to KI is that it's an island and there has been no economical way to get the timber off the island and as the ferry service is located on the eastern side at Penneshaw, it is right smack bang in the middle of the tourist area - not exactly ideal for a logging route. 

The combination of these factors caused the prices of timber plantation on KI to crater, which in turn have created serious opportunity.

Out of the rubble, KPT emerged with 30% of the planted timber on KI, along with New Forests with 60% and individuals collectively hold the remaining 10%. I had the good opportunity to uncover this opportunity back in June 2014 when I discussed the situation at length with the great Fred Woollard from Samuel Terry Asset Management, who is the major shareholder in KPT. KPT was then $3 (a fraction of land value alone) and given it is now $27.20, it's fair to say I owe him one (I thought MNY was a good return tip, but a double is not quite as good as an 8 bagger). 

KPT has now positioned itself as the leading timber producer on KI with the recent agreement to purchase New Forests’ KI assets. This deal is phenomenal for KPT shareholders as the purchase price for the land and timber is cheap and crucially ensures KPT owns both potential sites for a second wharf.  

Getting control of both potential wharf sites is key: the government, recognising the need for a solution to export the timber to reinvigorate the economy, indicated only one approval will be given for a second site. KPT owns both Smith Bay and now Ballast Head (owned by New Forest). Smith Bay even contains a house which you can rent on Stayz.com.au. A picture of the site is shown below (note the buoy which is being used to test currents to determine wharf requirements):

So, KPT has now lodged a DA for the second wharf and if the approvals are given, the potential value accretion is enormous - despite the stock having already moved up so much. Slide 24 of the recent presentation (26/10/16) gives you some idea of what the business might be worth once the second wharf is built. As the owner of 58,000 acres of land (which ought to increase in value), a sustainable timber business generating in the order of $20m EBIT p.a. and a wharf owner, the potential upside is multiples from here. 

However, there will be another time for discussing the upside - I wanted to write this post to commend the major shareholders and management. Up until now, the board has not received much  cash remuneration but has been paid mostly in  shares (which they stand to become rich from). We've seen too many companies run by the wrong people: it's easy to get seduced (I have) by cheap stocks, but you also need the right managers with the right incentives to unlock and create value. KPT has  been exemplary in working with all stakeholders: residents, environmentalists, government and shareholders and have set the benchmark to judge other companies. 

Kristian

Disclosure - own KPT and MNY

Underestimating or Overestimating Management

Morgans (Scone) held their first 'Value in the Vines' conference: a one day conference in the Hunter Valley Crowne Plaza where CEO's presented their companies. The format I most enjoyed was the 'fireside chat' with Grant Bourke (co-founder of Domino's Pizza (DMP)) and Richard Rijs (Patties Foods) hosted by Sam Paradice. This was held after dinner and a few red wines, so the atmosphere was quite relaxed. The focus wasn't valuations and going through slide decks or EBITDA margins, but personal stories about the highs and lows of building a business. 

Both Domino's and Patties sell fairly commoditised products, yet both have had outstanding success. They cited a common thread for their success: for slightly different reasons, they both heavily emphasised the importance of people at all levels in the company. Grant Bourke gave the example of how he and Don Meij went and door knocked around a suburb to drum up business for a struggling store. That's commitment. 

It helped cystallise some thoughts on management. I have at times both underestimated and overestimated management. Unlike balance sheet items, you can't just pigeonhole people so easily - everyone is different. And on top of that you can easily make the mistake of superimposing your own thoughts and biases and see people or situations for how you think they should be seen. 

Management can be male or female, drive an expensive car or a cheap car, swear or not swear, be an introvert or extrovert, be funny or boring, educated or a school drop-out - the list goes on. But do these factors indicate whether they will be successful? 

A good example of a bias is the car they drive. Value investors tend to tut-tut expensive cars, but to many there isn't anything wrong with driving a nice car - it's a symbol of wealth and success, after all. I've heard the same comment about the clothes a CEO wears - one particular CEO who we have done very well out of this year has been criticised for dressing like a slob. He does. But he's a great manager. In another example where we have more than doubled our money in the last 12 months the feedback about the Managing Director is that he is a poor presenter. That's true. But the guy is just itching to go and make money - and doesn't really care about how he presents. 

Another mistake is to think managers will act in the best interest of their shareholders. This style of thinking is a big trap in turnarounds or bombed out situations. It is so easy to see value and think managers will get in there and realise that value. But what happens if they aren't incentivised to do that? What happens if they are on a big fat salary and downsizing the business actually works against their personal interest? 

Underestimation can be particularly annoying. Some of the CEO's out there are really smart and can keep finding ways to squeeze value - even when you can't see it. Graham Turner at Flight Centre is a great case in point: he has kept driving profits from the bricks and mortar business even though many think online is the only way to go. I'd put Stuart Brown from Blackwall (BWR and BWF) in this category. 

So it's easy to make superficial judgment calls about someone. It's easy to buy a stock when it is cheap and wonder why management doesn't do the 'obvious'. It's easy to pass on a stock because it looks fully valued but watch the price just keep going up anyway as the manager finds a new market, a new product or more costs to squeeze out. I've made both kinds of mistakes plenty of times. 

Grant Bourke and Richard Rijs suggest placing a very large focus on people. Jim Collins in Good to Great found a similar trait among higher performing CEO's: look at the who before the what. One summary word that Venture Capitalist Fred Wilson has used is 'hustle'. You want someone with hustle - the person who is driven to make things happen. Similarly, Chris Sacca (also a VC) looks for someone with inevitability. He cites Travis Kalanick from uber as a prime example. The best example of inevitability I've seen this year is Emefcy (EMC): after meeting the management and board, it just seemed certain the company would be a success - even though at that time it had no revenue (it's since risen fourfold). A larger focus on people has helped me improve considerably. There are  of course always other factors to consider - that's part of the art of weighing things up. Ideally you find outstanding management and a company with outstanding fundamentals. Unfortunately, it just doesn't happen that often. One stock I will be writing about soon had both - and the results have been spectacular. 

Kristian 

Disclosure - own BWR

Future Blog Posts

Since beginning this blog in December 2012, I have written 86, 34, 25 and 8 blog posts in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. This is ironic given that during this time my skills have improved dramatically.  The improvement is a result of lots of hard work and research along with working closely with some really smart and experienced people.  One of the great things about investing is that if you have an open mind and desire to learn, you just get better and better, your networks get wider and you can deal with the highs and lows with calmness. 

2016 has been busy. On the personal side, we had our daughter and on the professional side, the primary focus has been to drive investment performance. That journey will always continue, and we are well on our way to meeting objectives.  To enhance this process, I would now like to get back to writing more frequently. There are lots of insights to discuss and I enjoy sharing my perspective.   As always, feedback is welcome and appreciated as we can always learn from one another. I will focus the dialogue on stocks where there was a good lesson or there is an interesting story - there are a lot of interesting companies and people out there having a positive impact on the community. More broadly, I will discuss tangential issues that I have found useful.  

Thank you, 

Kristian 

Capital Allocation

In October last year I wrote a post called Feedback Loop. As discussed in that post, I keep a detailed record of all decisions to look for areas of improvement. This research provided some key insights that have laid the foundations for me to become a significantly better investor.

Of the process review, I initially spent the majority of my time on individual stocks: looking at winners and losers and my rationale for taking or not taking trades. Over time another factor also became apparent: capital allocation. What I have caught myself doing, and seen others do, is make capital allocation decisions inconsistent with the investment idea.

The text book example is doing some good analysis, deciding a stock is going up, and then buy an insignificant amount. If the idea is good, the risk is low and there is plenty of upside, it makes no sense to get gun shy and just buy a little bit.

It's easier said than done. The preferred format that works for my psychology is to build into a position. I'll buy an initial amount and then just keep buying - either because it has got cheaper, or even buy more as it is going up and I have more evidence to support the investment case.

However there are times when you just need to pile in. A good company may be getting sold off for no particularly good reason, so you may not get the chance to buy more if you just dip your toes in the water. Or, if you know decent buying is about to arrive, then chances are it is best to get more aggressive. So there are times for building and times for piling in - it depends on how fast things are moving.

Since establishing Sapient Capital to run family money, I have been a lot more assertive with allocating more capital when the odds really stack up: with good results. A friend recently forwarded me an article from Stanley Druckenmiller outlining the importance of betting big when the right opportunity comes up. Druckenmiller notes that he and George Soros bet 21.4% of their fund on the British Pound short in 1992 and the great investors like Icahn and Buffett allocate aggressively when the time is right.

This all sounds good, but what happens if it all goes wrong. The key question I asked myself was "what do I need to do to get the confidence to allocate decent amounts of capital?" This is far more than assessing the upside and downside: I needed to have the confidence the assessment of upside and downside was pretty reliable. It's easy to get seduced by thinking the downside is X. The downside could be 2X if you are wrong. Malcolm Gladwell notes it takes 10,000 hours of deliberate practise to become world class. So my confidence came from researching and reviewing over five hundred previous decisions. It's not fun going back and looking at losers (I've had plenty), but it's a lot more fun than losing money now. This provided a much clearer insight into winning stocks and understanding where I could have an edge. Building different templates of winning situations and losing situations makes it much easier to make good quality and confident decisions when they come along.

Kristian 

Elders Hybrids (ELDPA)

The above photo from Reservoir Dogs was taken from the Elders Ltd (ELD) v Elders Hybrids (ELDPA) post, written back in 2013.  I was intrigued by the stand-off between ELD and ELDPA holders and why the ELDPA share price was being discounted so aggressively ($15 at the time of writing) while the ELD share price itself was performing 'okay' (around 8c or 80c following the 1-for-10 consolidation in 2014).

Since then, life has actually worked out well for both ELD and ELDPA. Really well. Thanks to a major improvement in the fundamentals of the business, ELD has marched up to $3.76; an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 70% p.a. Even more impressive is the performance of ELDPA. The company has recently offered to redeem ELDPA for $95 equating to an IRR of 88% p.a - truly outstanding. 

The initial logic of preferring ELDPA was correct. But far more importantly, it was the actual business performing well that has saved the day - NOT any decision between ELD and ELDPA -both ELD and ELDPA has been massive performers.  A very similar stand-off has been in play for years now at Paperlinx/Spicers. The big difference is the Spicers business is still struggling and both SRS and PXUPA flounder. You would be technically correct in thinking PXUPA sit higher up in the capital structure, but if the business never recovers then it doesn't matter. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: no position in the above names, except a nominal holding in SRS to gain attendance to the AGM. 

The Value Trap (Part 2) / Platinum Roadshow

As ever, Platinum make a great presentation and the recent Platinum Roadshow (2016) was no exception. 

CIO Andrew Clifford discusses the big macro issue of the day, namely extremely low interest rates and the pervasive impact this has had around the world through causing asset price bubbles. This relates directly to the previous article I blogged about in The Value Trap: value traps are created where excess investment has been made in a particular area. Connecting the dots: lower interest rates forces capital into more speculative assets, which cause asset price bubbles, which causes future oversupply which causes more value traps. 

This is also joined at the hip by vastly improved IT systems which have increased productivity, which in it's own way is contributing to oversupply (capacity is increased if everyone can do more each day).

If you buy this argument, then life is tough for the stoic value investor - you just can't buy 'cheap' stuff and hope for the best. However - blame for poor returns has typically been pointed at momentum traders ignoring the market and just focussing on the few in-vogue growth stocks and ignoring everything else. While it is true there has been a handful of stand-out performers, I believe blaming momentum traders for poor value returns is largely incorrect. It's poor analysis (which I have been guilty of too) through confusing value with value traps. As Platinum go on to explain, while returns from Japanese equities have been dreadful as a whole, stand-out returns have been made by investing in reasonably priced growth stocks with high dividend yields.

This does mean saying 'no' more a lot more often - there just aren't a huge number of unique opportunities out there (but happily still plenty to go around). It also means being far more patient - it can take a very long time for oversupply to be soaked up - if ever. A few examples: Australia will probably never again have a 'shortage' of grocery shelves, and last year I holidayed in Rhode Island (US) where you could see plenty of old textile mill buildings - I wonder how many investors got burnt waiting for the turnaround. Being aware of these pitfalls has made a huge difference to my investing. 

Kristian 

The Value Trap

A friend recently forwarded me an article written by Edward Chancellor called The Value Trap. 

It's an excellent article, and one that would have saved me plenty of money on previous occasions. In a nut-shell: value investing works, but money can be lost through being seduced into value traps. What's a value trap? A superficially cheap stock (such as a low price to book) but where the underlying assets have already experienced a high level of growth and are now in deep oversupply. 

The common value trap is buying a mining company when it looks cheap. BHP looked cheap on simplistic valuation ratios at $40. But there was a lot of money spent on expanding production during the boom creating future oversupply. The maxim of buying mining companies when they are expensive and sell them when they look cheap seems to hold fairly true. Dare I say it, avoiding BHP was fairly obvious as the mining boom faded, however, value traps are often far more subtle and and far more ubiquitous than thought.

Boom Logistics (BOL) has been a first-class value trap. Too many cranes. Not enough demand. BOL does have other issues, but perfectly fits the bill of a group of assets (crane) in oversupply.  BOL has been 'cheap' for a long time but still the share price just keeps going down as the glut continues. 

Conversely, my mentors have taught me to look through the cycle of a company - look beyond current valuation measures to future supply and demand. The real trick comes from finding undiscovered companies that are experiencing more demand than supply in whatever they do - not just now, but in the future. Often this means buying a company that actually looks expensive based on current year financials but is going through a sustainable uptick in demand, industry rationalisation - whatever. I noted in the Feedback Loop post that cheap stocks can be very dangerous and also it is a mistake to write off stocks because they look expensive. Of my three biggest winners over the last 12 months, one was a deep discount, another had an infinite PE (no E) and the other on a PE of 31 (small E). My three biggest losers have all been of the value-trap variety.

Asset growth is slightly harder to quantify in service businesses, and is probably easier to re-deploy should an oversupply develop. It takes a long time to soak up excess housing and mining infrastructure (you can't just make it go away) but a bank can quickly reduce headcount. However I think the concept still holds true - be careful where a lot of resource has been allocated to something, regardless of price. The first cafe in a suburb probably makes great money, but after the tenth the profitability has been whittled down. The guys first to market typically make great money and then more resources (competition) follows and the industry matures and delivers more pedestrian ROEs. 

Perhaps this is why software businesses can provide outsize returns (for reasons over and above the obvious scale effects they can achieve). Because they can roll-out so quickly, it is difficult for competition to catch-up and therefore they achieve monopoly status and enjoy the outsize ROE).  I look at Pro Medicus (PME) and shake my head in wonder at fast it is capturing market share and the profits it will earn. Google has left its competitors for dust and I'm not aware of significant investment outside of a few obvious names allocating cash to catch them. The mining boom was different - massive amounts of capital were spent trying to capture the returns from higher commodity prices.

Kristian