Wednesday, 16 September 2015

Paperlinx (PPX and PXUPA)



Well, we can all be glad that issue is sorted. Belligerence seems to be the company motto, which has cost both PPX and PXUPA huge sums of money. Maybe it's time for David Thodey to become CEO and work amicably with stakeholders. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: own PXUPA

Wednesday, 9 September 2015

Paperlinx (PPX and PXUPA)

This is a quick post on a issue that was brought to my attention last night (Tuesday night, Sydney time). 

Christopher Sommers and his team/advisers at Blue Pacific (New York) look to have uncovered a potentially significant issue for PXUPA holders. 


I won't regurgitate the press release fully, however in summary the argument is that a change in capital structure has taken place (2013 and 2014) triggering an event allowing Paperlinx SPS (PXUPA) to convert into preference shares. The preference shares have a face value of $100, so depending on how these are converted (cash or ordinary PPX shares) it potentially means PXUPA finally end up with control (at least 95%, if not 100%) of the business.  

If the argument holds true, it is an incredible slip by the company and incredible slip by the rest of the investment community to not pick this up. I am working through this issue (along with everything else!). Any comments appreciated - feel free to email if you prefer private discussion. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: own PXUPA


Saturday, 5 September 2015

Please help - study group required

I'm looking at a company that installs an electronic reward based system in small businesses such as cafes, gyms and restaurants. The company is rapidly piling in merchants on a free trial basis however the key issue is whether these businesses will be happy to start paying this company once the trial ends. 

If you run a small business like the ones above or if you know someone who does, I would love to get your feedback. Please contact me directly on the email listed under my profile. 

Thanks,

Kristian 


Wednesday, 2 September 2015

SoulCycle

I have an interest in the fitness industry, and have just spent some time in the states looking at different operations. Fitness has long been dominated by the traditional 'big-box' style gyms such as Fitness First. Over the last 10 years this model has been tweaked with the rise of the 24/7 gyms utilising a smaller footprint, no classes (reduces rent and salary), less front-desk staff and of course are open 24 hours. In Australia, Anytime Fitness pretty much won the race thanks to a great business model and first mover advantage. 

The next wave of change in the industry has been the rise of boutique operators specialising in group training. Think CrossFit, F45 Training, Orange Theory, Barry's Bootcamp, Fhitting Room and the focus of this post - SoulCycle. These are literally businesses that specialise in providing classes and nothing else. There are classes for all tastes including barre, strength, spin and HIIT (high-intensity-interval-training). 

Side note: there is now even a new sub-industry aggregating classes provided by different providers such as ClassPass. ClassPass members gain access to a wide range of classes across different gyms. So you can choose between boxing at one place, cardio at another and barre at another place. This will potentially end up like the travel industry - the aggregators (agents) will be the ones who make money by clipping the ticket without having to bother with investing in physical property at the expense of the gyms. But that is a separate post altogether. 


Group training is turning into big business. And it doesn't get much bigger than SoulCycle which has filed for IPO. See here for the preliminary IPO.

SoulCycle is a mixture of spin class and ra ra. So it's literally a spin class, but the lights are turned down and the feel good factor is turned right up - lots of positive affirmations and American energy in the room. The prospectus itself is a good bit of propaganda. Try this on (page 2):


It sounds a bit cheesy, but let's face it the Americans do the positive stuff really well. And culture, along with a good dollop of celebrity pulling-power, is the competitive edge here - the actual product is literally a spin class and is therefore a commodity. But the positive vibes is what allows them to absolutely print money and the growth in earnings is phenomenal. Again, from the prospectus (page 2):


To break that down a bit more, in 2014 there were 2.9m rides (across 81,317 classes). Studio fees were US$91.8m meaning each ride generated US$31. $31 is a big number for one spin class! Standard classes are $35 and gets a bit cheaper if you buy class-packs. Classes can actually cost up to US$70 for the premium concierge service called SuperSoul. And I understand cancellation fees apply. So each bike can clip the ticket three ways: cancellation fees, standard fees and the SuperSoul service. Plus there is plenty of money made by selling merchandise, water, shoes etc - just another $18m revenue.

SoulCycle works on a corporate store model with 38 stores across the states mostly in NYC, Los Angeles and San Francisco.  Interestingly, they don't work on a franchise model but instead invest heavily in their staff training and career development. It's quite a feat to develop a big, growing network and still deliver outstanding service, and one that I am genuinely in awe. This speaks volumes about the underlying culture of the organisation. Starbucks and Chipotle are other organisations delivering great, consistent service across a corporate store model which again, I find incredibly impressive.

Being a preliminary IPO, the selling price is not disclosed, so there is plenty of speculation about this - I've heard some obscene numbers thrown around that I won't bother repeating. How much would you pay? Rapidly growing business, great margins, but a product that could easily lose it fizzle if the culture starts fading. This could of course all be a bit of a fad and an attempt to cash-in on strong equity markets. Well, the equity markets were strong when the listing was made! This feels like a bit like when Virgin Blue listed in Australia - lots of razzamatazz but ultimately an airline selling a commodity product in a highly competitive industry.  I wouldn't be surprised to see the listing pulled if the markets continue their shank.

It's not for me, but the rise of SoulCycle is nonetheless a fascinating tale.
Kristian

Tuesday, 25 August 2015

Boom Logistics (BOL)

Since my last post on BOL (where I had a decent whinge), the company has reported yet another deteriorating set of full year figures and in my opinion a continued lack of genuine action at the board level. To get it out of the way, I recently sold my position - before the market really went into free-fall. Absolutely nothing to do with timing, just pure analysis. My point is the recent market issues didn't have an influence on my rationale. 

In no particular order, here are some of the key issues as I see it: 
  • NTA is slipping, and quickly. BOL is an asset play, pure and simple. However the ideal asset play has at least a stable or growing book value. BOL dropped from 49c to 41c in one year alone. Is 41c the floor? Who knows. I can't see how the valuation will hold up if the return on the assets remain poor. 
  • Revenue is disappearing quickly. Again, in one year alone, revenue has dropped from $273m to $207m. That's a huge drop.  
  • CEO is still on a big salary (despite a 10% pay cut last year). $675,000 p.a. is to just too big considering the performance of the business.
  • Bullish forecast. Management has not delivered earnings growth, yet now forecasts a decent turnaround in a tough environment. FY16 forecast EBITDA is $20m-$30m, which is higher than normalised FY15.   
  • Another change in CFO. 
  • Taken management a long time to admit the real reason for not conducting the buy-back is debt covenants. 

Obviously the business could turn around from here. To me, that's fine. I'm happy to jump back in when there is some evidence to support re-purchasing.  

Kristian 

Disclosure: no position in BOL 

Tuesday, 18 August 2015

Paperlinx (PPX and PXUPA)

You may have seen recent some media articles about some new shareholder agitation around the no-win capital structure at PPX/PXUPA. I have been commenting on this situation for some time now and as noted in my last post on the topic bought some PXUPA in May. 

As noted previously, the 'trimmed down' PPX is basically owned by PXUPA shareholders. The face value of the PXUPA is $285m v my balance sheet estimation of $210m. Therefore PPX are basically worthless at the moment. At the time of the last post, I couldn't see why PPX was performing better than PXUPA however that trend has corrected itself (at least for the time being) with PPX falling from 3.6c to 2.6c and PXUPA holding up okay rising from $9.50 to $10.46. 

The new main agitator, Blue Pacific Partners, has outlined what I think is a pretty reasonable plan and can be read in full here. 

The key proposal is to offer PXUPA shareholders 1,000 PXP shares for every PXUPA. This means PXUPA holders (assuming 100% converted) would collectively own 2.85bn PPX shares. There are 609m original PPX shares bringing the total share count to 3.459bn shares of which 82% would be owned by former PXUPA holders and 18% by the initial PPX shareholders. 

What I really like about the proposal is that it delivers a win-win for both PPX and PXUPA holders. Using Blue Pacific's conservative value of $125m (much less than the $210m I noted above), each share is worth 3.6c. So the PXUPA would be worth $36 each and PPX shareholders actually have a genuine value of 3.6c (and not just the pure lottery ticket value they currently have which will sooner or later expire like a decaying option).  

As a PXUPA holder, I have zero expectations of every receiving $100. However $36 is a decent hair cut and if it allows the situation to be sorted out I would accept it. 

But of course this is all just theory. Management actually have to themselves adopt such a plan, and based on the track record we can't hold our breath. However my reason for buying a few months ago was the Board stepping in and shedding everything non-ANZ. This has been done, so let's see now if they step up and sort out the capital structure. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: own PXUPA

Tuesday, 21 July 2015

Keybridge Capital Ltd Convertible Notes (KBCPA)

Regular readers will know of my interest in different types of securities like bonds, preference, hybrids, convertibles and so forth. As noted in previous posts, I wish there were more of them. Well structured and well priced alternate securities can offer investors a cracking deal especially in circumstances where downside is structurally limited (think WESN (now longer listed) and AFIG for example) and fundamentally limited with upside potential. Unfortunately there aren't many on offer (in Australia) and none really at a decent discount in this market. 

But please don't take my word for it - just look at the doyen himself, Warren Buffett. A great example of an alternate investment he made is Goldman Sachs (GS). Back in 2008 Buffett bought US$5bn of GS 10% p.a. preferred stock which included warrants to purchase a further $5bn ordinary GS shares at at a strike price of $115 anytime up to five years from date of issue. So that gave him the right to buy 43.5m shares for $115 which based on the current price of US$212 would have been a profit of $4.2bn. Interestingly, the deal was amended in 2013 so Buffett ended up with 13m shares but didn't have to pay for them (now worth $2.8bn plus his preferred's). That's a great deal.   

Apologies, I digress - back to the story. 

One new stock that doesn't fit the bill of upside optionality, but is interesting nonetheless is KBCPA. KBC is issued by the mother-of-all magnets to the value community - Keybridge (KBC). KBC itself is a collection of all sorts of investments all over the world. Please note it is not the purpose of this post to explore KBC - that is a long story in itself. KBC has a market cap of $27.8m (17.5c). The new KBCPA were issued at $1 in June and there are 5m on issue. 

KBCPA were actually issued to existing KBCPA shareholders as an in-specie (non-cash) distribution on a 1 for 36 basis. Why? There are a number of reasons. It provides additional funding in the future - i.e. issue more KCPA to help fund a project. This is smart - the notes are unsecured and provide debt without the banks placing restrictive debt covenants. More directly, the notes appear to have been a way to return some excess capital to shareholders without actually handing over any cash! Instead of KBC's cash going down, debt goes up. The effect to net equity is the same however they retain the cash to invest. And also quite smart is the new channel it creates to pay out franking credits. The notes are 7% fully franked meaning lots of franking credits for holders. 

So on a grossed up basis, the yield is 10% p.a. which is really attractive in today's market. A 10% p.a. yield is roughly the same as the long term combination of growth and dividends from the stock market - so you can understand if investors interested is piqued (especially if you think KBC is pretty safe). Even as I write, a few have trade above the issue price. 

For me, I want upside potential. Either through favourable conversion terms such as a fixed exercise price (see the Buffett deal) or a discount to the face value (in cases where the maturity term is fixed as is the case with KBCPA). Who knows, maybe the market will get really scared for some general reason or Nick Bolton stuffs something up and they get sold off well below face value. But for the time being these conditions are not present so it's a pass for me. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: no position in the above names