Wednesday, 26 February 2014

Boom Logistics (BOL)

Bombed Out Big Time

This post is written by Nigel Littlewood. We have looked at BOL extensively and we both own BOL

Boom was a classic industry consolidation play. The stock market gets taken for rides pretty regularly by wily entrepreneurs who promise riches of gold simply by buying a number of small industry participants and rolling them together (seemingly effortlessly) to create a much larger corporation with the corresponding cost savings and pricing power. Boom was to become the market leader in the crane industry by consolidating a number of acquisitions.

It’s my experience that this strategy rarely delivers on the initial promises provided while the strategy may make sense, it often fails in execution and it is one of my rules to avoid investing in such plays.  As Warren Buffett says,  “I don’t like to swing at a pitch until it’s left the pitchers hand”

Boom was one such venture that was put together and listed in Oct 2003 and continued to keep buying crane providers right into the stock market boom of 2006-2007 where its shares reached circa $5 a share before beginning a very long fall to lows of 7c last year a mighty fall of around 99%. AND that folks is why we are looking at it.

While there have been mistakes made within the business since listing, I’m not going to spend time on the history as it’s the future that will matter to us as shareholders. In 2008 the company got a new CFO, a woman called Iona Macpherson …who is probably 20% better than the average male CFO and had to be, to get the job. She is energetic, intelligent and full of enthusiasm for the progress made and the challenges ahead. We have been impressed during our limited contact with her so far. One year after Iona was appointed, a new CEO also joined her. Brenden Mitchell has had a tough job in bringing the business back from the brink. We have been impressed with both Iona and Brenden although we look forward to meeting with them regularly going forward.
Brenden has invested significant amounts of his own money in the shares at higher prices.

The shares are trading at 16c having fallen a long way from their highs. The stock is well out of favour although investors are starting to look at the stock again, management confirmed they are getting calls from professional investors both here and in the US.

Despite a dramatic slow down in the economy and a collapse in mining CAPEX spend, BOL continues to report a profit at the EBITDA line despite lower than targeted capacity utilisation rates. Since 2009 the company has maintained its margins while revenue has contracted, excess cash has been used to reduce debt from $245m to circa $105m while rev has fallen from $400m to under $280m.  EBITDA margin has actually been maintained during this time at around 17%-18%.  

So far management has given us confidence that they are honest and competent…let’s hope nothing happens to change this view.

Secondly, we are seeing a pick up in construction and housing, and expect increased spending on infrastructure in Australia in the years ahead, it was even discussed at the recent G20 summit held in Sydney. The very soft conditions in mining maintenance should pick up albeit we expect margins will be under pressure but BOL management seems intent on maintaining a disciplined approach to pricing with a long-term goal of tripling return on invested capital.

So to summarise, things are very tough in this industry but hey that’s why we are looking at it, if things were going well the shares wouldn’t be at 16c.

So how do the financials look right now?
Share price             16c
Shares                     $469m
Mkt Cap                 $75m
Current Net Debt    $105m
EV                            $180m

                                    2014(f)
EBITDA                       $50m
NPAT:                           $9m
Free Cash flow           $30m (this will probably fall to $20m in 2015 due a lack of asset sales)
Net tangible assets    $250m

So this year we have:
free cashflow multiple:         under 3x.
EBITDA multiple:                  under 4x
EBIT multiple:                       8.4x
p/e                                          8.2x
Int cover                                 6x       
div yield                                 0

On the face of it, current earnings look pretty attractive but not super exciting. However, it is trading at around a third of NTA so while I concede we don’t want to be a seller of a large fleet of cranes in a fire sale, its an indication of just how bombed out the stock is. The potential upside in this stock isn’t created by the current earning’s environment. Indeed it’s created by an (even slight) improvement in revenue and a corresponding holding or improvement of margin.

In the event that revenues go half way back to where they were in 2009, we would see the company generating EBITDA of around $60m (assuming margin stability) providing an ebitda multiple of 3x. With any sign of improvement in the macro environment, this stock has significant upside potential. The market has a bearish bias on BOL right now (with fair reason) but with a shift in that attitude towards a more neutral view, an EBITDA multiple of 6x would not be unreasonable, combined with an improved bottom line and the stock could go much higher.

When we bought PMP at 15c, the stock was being priced for going broke…imminently and that investment has delivered returns of 200% so far so you don’t need much of a market shift to see strong upside…but you do need patience.

Management has suggested it would like to buy back stock when debt is under $100m which should be post the end of the current fiscal year, assuming revenues are stable, its hard to see why the company wouldn’t buy stock back at a third of NTA.

So we have a pretty well-run business in a tough industry at a challenging point in the cycle trading at reasonable multiples if things are stable to better going forward. For patient investors this stock has the capacity to deliver significant upside while downside is somewhat underpinned by a big discount to NTA, and management’s intention to cut fixed costs further. This isn’t a stock for those with a negative view on Australia but with a modest improvement in mining maintenance spend, a pick up in infrastructure activity and continued pick up in building, this stock will make more money and its low multiples will increase. At some point in the next decade (or so) this stock will probably be the darling of the cycle again and the market will like it and that will be the time to sell.

As the old saying goes: Buy in gloom, sell in boom.


Wednesday, 19 February 2014

Clime Investment Management (CIW)

In the previous post I referred to a company run by management with a sensible approach to capital management. CIW is like The Magic Pudding - it just keeps giving thanks to its strong cash-flow being deployed on shareholder favourable terms: ordinary and special dividends, buy-backs and conservative investments. This is not a cigar-butt story. This is a fair price for a good company story that should - touch wood - continue to reward shareholders through growing dividends and share price. 

CIW is mostly a financial services business comprising cash, a funds management business, investment in its own managed funds, a stock-market research business and also owns a business supplying stationery and office supplies. Half year results have just been posted  - here is a summary of the balance sheet: 


CIW has provided the value of Cash, Managed Fund Investments and Jasco. It is up to us to value the stock-market research and funds management businesses to get an overall valuation of the company. Here is a breakdown of the revenue/profitability for the last

StocksInValue is a subscription service to help value investors find cheap stocks. It was folded into a JV with the popular Eureka Report (owned by Newscorp), which in my opinion was an excellent move to increase brand awareness for the Clime funds business. The JV is losing a bit of money at the moment, and I'm not sure if you can get too excited about a valuation for that type of business. For the purposes of this analysis and to keep things simple, I am valuing it as zero as a stand-alone business.

This leaves the funds management business. CIW has have just launched an international fund to leverage off the success of its successful Australian stock focused business. FUM growth for its local funds continues to impress: up from $448m 30 June to $527m by the end of December. Given the leverage to FUM growth (costs don't increase anywhere near as fast as revenue when FUM grows), the value of a funds business can increase exponentially. Let's assume ongoing MER and performance fees are 1% p.a. (which will mean CIW isn't making much performance fee revenue). At $527m revenue is $5.27m p.a. At $1bn, revenue is $10m p.a. I doubt if expenses will increase by more than $1m at the same time - probably a lot less. Conservatively the funds business could be valued at $30m based on current FUM and easily double if it reaches $1bn. Let's stick with $30m Stripping out intangibles and adding in $30m gives a loose value of $46.9m or 94c: a little bit above the current price of 86c. Please note these are my valuations only and should not be relied upon.

Kristian 

Disclosure: own CIW

Please get in touch! I am always on the lookout for interesting stock ideas, with a particular emphasis on deep-value, growth companies run by outstanding management and arbitrage opportunities.

Sunday, 9 February 2014

Capital Management

Nigel Littlewood and I have been reading The Outsiders: Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success. It’s a great book that analyses some true superstar CEOs that have delivered exceptional performance for shareholders. During their tenure - with the shortest being 19 years and the longest 46 years (Warren Buffett), the companies they managed delivered an average annual return of 21.6% v the S&P500 10.2%. That’s double the return of the stock market and the long term compounding effects truly eye-popping: for every 10 years on a pre-tax basis, the additional performance is a factor of 2.7 times. 

The CEOs had a number of things in common. Most notably is their unequivocally disciplined approach to capital management. They aren’t necessarily great at product, process or people management. But they are outstanding at capital management. Deploying capital to the project with the best (risk adjusted) ROE is the common mantra and don’t let money burn a hole in their pocket. If they can’t find a good investment when they have spare cash, they either let it sit in the bank or return it to shareholders. Consider that Warren Buffett (Berkshire Hathaway) sits on tens of billions of dollars of cash and Henry Singleton (Teledyne) ultimately bought back ~90% of Teledyne stock when the price occasionally traded at cheap levels.

Investing Nirvana occurs when you find such a CEO and you can buy the stock at a reasonable valuation. My colleagues and I often wonder about our tendency to buy cheap stocks run by crappy management. Even if the outcome is profitable, the experience is unpleasant. It would be far more profitable and pleasant to find outstanding management and back them with your cash.

In particular, it is our experience that companies undertaking buy-backs in decent volume when prices appear to cheap is often a beacon pointing toward management who aren’t trying to take over the world, but deploying shareholder capital judiciously. Famed short-seller Jim Chanos apparently somewhat disagrees with this view. Mr Chanos takes the view management is signalling they think they can more money in the stock market than by investing in real assets. We don’t really understand this view: if a company is trading below intrinsic value or NTA, then (all-things-being-equal) stock buy-backs make sense.

In the next blog we will discuss a company that is buying-back stock in reasonable volume that we believe is run by first-class management with a sensible and conservative approach to capital management.

Kristian

Friday, 17 January 2014

AIMS Property Securities Fund (APW)

Most recent post here

Management have still not answered my question as to why a DRP has been introduced. This is poor form. It shouldn't be difficult to quickly articulate a reason (it should have been done anyway when it was announced). If I am missing something, I will happily concede the point. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: own APW

Tuesday, 14 January 2014

Keybridge Capital Ltd (KBC)

Note: I have been sitting on this post for some weeks pondering the situation. Following the supplementary bidders statement released by Oceania (13 January), I have decided to post it. 

KBC is a stock I recently traded for a profit. I managed to sell for 16c literally right before the takeover by Oceania for 16c was announced. It is normally really dumb to sell for the initial takeover price as a higher bid could emerge. My timing was therefore awful. 

Normally the correct strategy is to buy at or around the takeover price when a firm bid is announced on the basis of minimal downside and uncapped upside if a higher bid emerges. I prefer a takeover bid when the target company has an actual business or NTA supporting the price so if the bid falls over the downside shouldn't be monstrous. Compare this to failed takeover bids on mining exploration stocks where the downside is often obscene. 

I have so far decided not to re-buy KBC. You may disagree. Either way, let's look at some of the salient issues.

1. Background  

KBC is run by Nicholas Bolton (and also owns a big chunk of KBC stock) who found fame when he got involved in trying to sort out the Brisconnections debacle. KBC is a collection of crappy loans and bits and pieces that Nick Bolton is in the process of cleaning up and embarking on some acquisitions here and there. It is important to note KBC is in clean-up mode, not wind-up mode. I can't see a strategy for KBC. I will discuss some of the investments later in the NTA discussion.

KBC is a cigar-butt situation if ever there was one.

2. Takeover offer

The other major shareholder, Oceania Capital Partners (ASX: OCP), is unhappy with the speed of the process and wants to get control/more control and expedite the asset disposal process and get cash back to shareholders. Or perhaps it just wants to agitate Nick Bolton to hurry up. The desired outcome is pretty much the same either way.

Oceania has offered 16c cash for all of the shares it doesn't own. Defeating conditions are minimal. The bid is off-market however Oceania can also buy shares on-market at or below the offer price. KBC is trading bid/offer 17c/17.5c so assuming an 17.5c purchase price implies an 8.6% downside should no higher bid materialise. The downside is probably much higher should the bid fall over.

The offer is due to close 31 January however I would not be surprised to see the deadline extended. I also wouldn't be surprised if the offer falls lapses and falls over. It's not really clear if OCP really wants KBC and it's not clear whether many shareholders will accept the 16c offer and therefore whether a change of control will occur.

3. NTA  

Reported NTA is 22.3c. This includes 11.7c cash. However, the actual value might be very different to reported NTA. The 'Independent Expert' values KBC at 25-28c per share. In addition, there are franking credits of $8.1m or 4.6c and carry forward tax losses of a whopping $201m. However, ignoring franking and tax losses, let's look at the composition of the NTA. The table below shows the current book value and low-high value provided by Pitcher Partners (Independent Expert): 


Okay, there are plenty of little investments that aren't particularly material. Let's look at the elephants-in-the-room that account for 72% of book value ex cash:

PRFG. KBC now owns a $5.7m loan to PRFG v a book value of $1.2m. PRFG owns Australian Money Exchange which is in administration and buyers are being sought. Pitchers think this could be worth a lot more than book.  

Totana. This started with a E9.6m loan the building of a solar plant in Spain. The Spanish solar industry appears to have regulatory issues, and to be frank I have no idea of how KBC or Pitchers value this loan. 

Republic Private Equity. Not much detail on this position. 

P&J Projects. This is potentially the real kicker to the NTA. This is a subordinated $5.95m mezzanine loan package over a residential/retail project in Zetland, Sydney. KBC has written the loan down to zero. Pitcher disagrees: they think it is worth something. The loan is currently in default. The salvage value of the loan will ultimately depend on the sale value of the property developments.  

What I have been bemused about for some time and now find myself partially agreeing with OCP is why is KBC all of a sudden worth a lot more than reported NTA? 

In particular the book value of the Zetland (P&J Projects) is zero, yet based on some pretty scant information the value has shot up to $3.5m to $6m. Defensive play by the target? Or if Pitcher Partners genuinely think there is more value, then I vote they step in manage a wind-up at KBC.

Regardless of my speculation it is probably fair to say:
a) the NTA is higher than the takeover offer
b) actual NTA is very rubbery
c) (assuming the takeover falls over) NTA may not really matter if new investments are purchased
which may materially impact future NTA either up or down
d) the share price has previously traded at a significant discount to NTA and there is no vision as to why the discount should close should the bid fall over
e) it is difficult to assess upside potential without knowing the major assets in detail

One positive is the bid has forced KBC to come out with more information about it's investments and with the stock in the spotlight it might be less likely to trade at a fat discount to NTA.

An example of a similar successful takeover trade was Thakral Holdings (THG). At the time, the share price traded above the offer price but well below the NTA (THG was a property business). In short it was worth paying above the bid price betting the bid would be increased. I'm not so convinced this is as straight-cut at KBC given the rubbery NTA and motives of the bidder and target. 

So anyway, so while the upside is pretty good given that all of the NTA figures are above the current price not even mentioning franking credits, the situation is messy and potential plenty of downside if the offer falls over. I'm leaving it alone.

Kristian 

Disclosure: no position in KBC

Please get in touch! I am always on the lookout for interesting stock ideas, with a particular emphasis on deep-value, growth companies run by outstanding management and arbitrage opportunities. 

Monday, 23 December 2013

AIMS Property Securities Fund (APW - previously MPS)

One last post before Christmas. I have discussed APW/MPS extensively in previous posts and I expect to provide a more detailed update regarding the NTA in the new year - the NTA ought to be slowly creeping up thanks to the buy-back, St Kilda Road recapitalisation and the APN Regional Property Fund to name a few factors. 

For today, let's focus on the distribution announcement:

1. A total distribution of 0.15c will be paid, record date 31 December. 

The distribution is made up of 0.099c plus a special distribution of 0.051c. So a ~0.1c quarterly distribution equates to an annualised rate of 0.4c. Some people were expecting 1c. I thought this was un-realistic: a chunk of the underlying investments aren't paying distributions, so expecting a total distribution of ~$5m p.a. just isn't feasible at this point. If management get on with re-working the portfolio then much higher levels of distribution are possible in the future. 

The payment date is an un-necessarily distant ~21 March.

2. A Dividend Reinvestment Plan (DRP) has been activated.

This is bonkers. A DRP means new units will be issued at a 3% discount to the unit price. The unit price is already a massive discount to NTA. So the DRP is simply another capital raising at a massive discount to NTA. To make things worse, APW has no debt and has excess cash: it simply does not need the cash. 

Why management feels the need to conduct a DRP is beyond me. Why do they need to issue more scrip when at the same time they are buying-back stock? One reason might be that George Wang/AIMS want to increase their % of shareholding on the sly. The other reason might be that these guys are simply incompetent. If I'm missing something, please let me know and I will retract my words. 

I will be seeking a reason from management.  

In the meantime, please have a merry Christmas and safe new year.

Kristian

Disclosure: own APW

Please get in touch! I am always on the lookout for interesting stock ideas, with a particular emphasis on deep-value, growth companies run by outstanding management and arbitrage opportunities. 

Wednesday, 18 December 2013

RHG Ltd (RHG)

RHG has been a great trade this year, yet has gone to sleep since Cadence withdrew their bid in October. The scheme meeting to vote on the remaining bid (AMAC) was held today which predictably was overwhelmingly voted in favour of. 

This means that eligible RHG shareholders will be paid 50.1c cash ~ 8 January. 

Would love to have more trades like this. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: own RHG

Please get in touch! I am always on the lookout for interesting stock ideas, with a particular emphasis on deep-value, growth companies run by outstanding management and arbitrage opportunities.