Sunday, 29 September 2013

Where to invest at the end of QE

This post has been borrowed from Lauren Templeton Investments; a fund manager colleague Nigel Littlewood met in Omaha this year. Their summary of the end of QE and investing in such an environment is punchy and easy to understand. Their perspective is the same as that used to justify buying QBE in Australia this year by some investors.

I hope you enjoy their commentary.

If you picked up any given text book on investment and turned to the subject index in the back to locate the discussion on “QE taper” or “fiscal cliff” you would likely come up empty. Despite the void, the market has awarded primacy to these subjects over the past year, and generally speaking, company fundamentals have taken a backseat at times. In light of the Federal Reserve’s announcement last week that it will postpone its tapering of $85 billion in monthly bond purchases, it has become clear that these government policy sideshows will likely maintain the spotlight in the markets over the near-term.

Although it can be frustrating for a fundamentally driven value investor to see the markets propelled by policy announcements, sudden reversals or fearful sell-offs among near-term speculators can be equally rewarding for the bargain hunter. Given the Fed’s cold feet, it seems likely that speculation surrounding the tapering of bond purchases and now the looming debt ceiling talks in Washington will stay with us in the near-term. We suspect that one of the likely reasons that Bernanke and Co. hesitated with the widely expected September reduction in bond purchases was owed to concerns over the likelihood of another fiscal interruption a la the possible government shutdown. Other reasons for a pause could be owed to the fact that despite no reduction in bond purchases to date in 2013, rates have already tightened significantly during mid-2013 on the basis of Fed rhetoric. Finally, we cannot dismiss the fundamental observation that since the same mid-summer interest rate episode and the resulting sell-off in emerging market currencies, many emerging market exporters have now seen their near-term prospects rise on the basis of their cheaper currencies (think competitive devaluation in global currencies). As we know, this represents a potential loss in competitiveness and market share for exporters in countries whose currencies gained by comparison (U.S. and Europe, namely), also presenting an unwelcome curve ball in the face of rather fragile developed market economic improvements. Whatever the underlying cause, it seems reasonable to anticipate additional price volatility as the current policy of bond buying is not sustainable on an indefinite basis.

Having addressed near-term events, let us take a step back, and focus on the longer-term picture. From a rational perspective, it seems most probable that the thirty plus year bull market in bond prices will continue to unwind, and that interest rates are likely to be higher in the medium-to-long term. In our experience manias end when the euphoric buying of irrational participants ceases. In 2000, it was the day traders bidding up stocks on margin, in 2006 it was real estate speculators buying second and third homes with exotic adjustable rate or negative amortization mortgages, and in 2013 it is the Federal Reserve bidding up long-term bond prices with money it simply creates. The only question remaining is the pattern of the descent; drawn out and orderly, or the opposite.

The pattern of this unwinding is frankly anyone’s guess. Many investors seek to profit from the possible decline in the bond market by selling-short long-dated treasuries with high duration, or through derivatives that profit from rising interest rates. For those investors with less stomach for the risks that accompany selling short or employing derivatives, there are other options. To begin, investors could focus on businesses that should continue to gather fundamental strength in the face of higher interest rates. One company that we have discussed in the past and continue to favor is the cash-handling and security firm, Brinks Co., based on what we believe to be its fundamental benefit from higher interest rates that reflect a higher velocity of money throughout the economy.


A second firm, and for that matter group of firms that we believe should also experience a fundamental tailwind from higher interest rates is the life insurer Metlife, as well as competing life insurers and then to a somewhat lesser degree, reinsurers. The simple reality is that the extended period of low interest rates that have been in place since the financial crisis, coupled with lower economic activity, has made business conditions difficult and valuations depressed for Metlife and peers on a historical basis.

The fundamental reason for this difficulty is owed to the life insurer’s business model. Life insurers collect insurance premiums and invest them more on a relative basis—vis a vis other insurers—into longer dated bonds and treasuries, where yields have compressed to paltry rates under the Fed’s assorted QE programs. This business model makes life insurance firms resemble the more “bank-like” of the insurers in the sense that they derive a larger portion of profit from “spread income” than other types of insurers such as property and casualty. Put another way, given the nature of their long-term policy contracts, life insurers invest their float more heavily in fixed income, and for that matter fixed income with longer-dated maturities, in order to keep an appropriate match between assets and liabilities. In turn, as interest rates increase, life insurers are by necessity buying fixed income securities that are falling in price, and logically these securities are becoming more attractive from an investment return standpoint. Philosophically speaking, and as we have noted many times over, we like this approach towards investment. To purchase securities falling in price today for the benefit of higher future returns is rational behavior, in our view. We appreciate that life insurers will be compelled to do so. Second, and perhaps more important to the share price of the life insurer, the marginal purchase of bonds with higher yields should increase future investment profits (which comprises a large share of overall profit), which in turn drives higher returns on equity, and by extension rising returns on shareholder equity should logically increase the present value of expected net equity flows. Given that investing in higher yielding securities eventually leads to higher returns on equity for the life insurer (assuming cost of funds do not rise faster, etc.), and the market perceives that future returns on equity will continue to hurdle the cost of equity on a near-to-medium term basis, then it is more likely that the share price reflects a premium to book value, versus the current discount; Metlife currently trades at 0.9x 2013 estimated book value. Over the past ten years, the shares have traded at a median price to book of 1.2x. The catalyst in our view to Metlife realizing a premium to book value in its share price relies on the firm achieving a return on equity that approaches its pre-financial crisis levels of approximately 14-16% during 2006-2007, versus the current level of 11.5%. Most importantly, we believe that higher long-term interest rates represent the primary key to unlocking a fundamental reversion to pre-crisis levels of return on equity.

Interestingly, the thesis described above has gained traction in 2013, for instance over the course of the mid-summer spike in interest rates, shares in life insurers such as Metlife rallied in step. Even so, with returns on equity still depressed versus pre-crisis averages, and a valuation that remains discounted to book value, we believe that Metlife shares continue to trade at levels materially less than intrinsic value. Additionally, during the surprise announcement from the Fed last week that tapering would be postponed for the time being, shares in Metlife fell in price. Basically, as the market focused on the policy sideshow of postponed tapering, it sold off Metlife shares in a knee-jerk reaction. We believe that observation makes our discussion particularly relevant to the current environment and the remaining uncertainty surrounding Fed tapering. In sum, we see the potential to add additional shares in light of any near-term volatility that may be created on the basis of speculation surrounding Fed policy, or even fiscal policy if a government shutdown ensues and interest rates temporarily compress in a flight to safety (or worry over a possible recession if the shutdown persisted).

We appreciate your continued interest in our firm. If you would like to learn more about the registered investment advisor Lauren Templeton Capital Management, please visit us atwww.laurentempletoninvestments.com.


Lauren C. Templeton                                               Scott Phillips

Wednesday, 25 September 2013

Australia and Innovation

In Australia, there is concern about the lack of innovation. Instead, we are obsessed with houses, mining and sport. The media is partly to blame: we have been subjected to an election campaign for the last three years and all of the mind-numbingly boring and community degrading stuff that comes with it. This includes a bizarre obsession with demonising boat people who are looking for a better life.

However, yesterday I attended a presentation by Wholesale Investor from mostly small companies (listed and un-listed). The companies were a mixture of biotech, tech, medical, property and financial service. It was really inspiring to see some of the ideas and innovation efforts in this country.  Here are some examples:

  • Spondo/RivusTV: interface between movies and social media and video-streaming (i.e. movies). Watch a video directly from a movie facebook page, either PPV or advertisements. 
  • Skin Patrol: mobile skin cancer clinic utilising tele-dermatology technology. Provides services to companies and regional communities. 
  • Carnegie Wave Energy (CWE): submerged wave technology producing both energy and fresh water. Now going into production off the WA coast for the Navy. 
Plenty of other examples. 

It would be great to see more community awareness and encouragement of what our entrepreneurs are up to. It would be even better to see some of these companies really hit the big time and inspire a generation. 


Kristian

Disclosure: no positions in any of the above names

Friday, 20 September 2013

Galileo Japan Trust (GJT) v Astro Japan Property Group (AJA)

This week I attended a presentation by the managers of GJT as part of a major recapitalisation of its balance sheet (both equity and debt). The market cap of GJT pre the announcement was $6m and post the issue of 102m shares at $1.50 each, the market cap will be $172m at the current price of $1.56. 

It's recapitalisation 'Extreme Makeover' edition. 

The raw numbers have me interested, and to keep things simple for this post I have compiled the table below simplistically comparing headline figures for GJT pro-forma (post recap) and the other pure-play Australian listed Japanese property player; AJA:


Please note this assumes the recapitalisation is successful

There is lots of information missing such as the location and quality of properties, cash-flows, quality of management and so forth.  

With a 15c DPU on offer for GJT shareholders, its not surprising to see the share price shoot up from 75c pre the announcement to $1.56. What's more, the DPU will likely be tax deferred for up to 5 years thanks to the combination of debt and depreciation. 

More to follow. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: no position  in GJT or AJA

Thursday, 12 September 2013

FSA Group Ltd (FSA)

Written by Nigel Littlewood...

A couple of months ago I wrote an introductory piece on a small cap that I have a material investment in called FSA Group.

Since then, FSA has released its 2013 annual results and subsequently, the re-rating that has been going on for some time, has continued with the stock reaching $1.09 recently up from 75c when I mentioned it a few months back.

Lets consider the result:

At $1.09 the stock is capitalised at $137m (with excess cash of around $10m). For the year ending June 2013 FSA reported as follows:

Rev      $64m                                                  up 9%
PBT     $17.8m                                               up 19%
NPAT  $10.8m                                               up 26%
EPS     8.51c                                                   up 36%
Net cash inflow from op       $14m              up 49%
Dividends (full year)                        5c                    up 127%

The result was a little better than I had anticipated and the dividend was a full 1c higher than I expected for the full year too.

The post result commentary has highlighted the company’s intention to try and grow both loan books (mortgages and factoring) in the next couple of years and maintain existing profitability in the services division.  This strategy should provide further earnings growth and based upon the recently announced new banking terms with Westpac, this growth will be self funding and wont require further capital.

While the stock is now trading above $1, a healthy move since I first mentioned it at 75c, it’s far from expensive. On the basis that we see a 10% improvement in earnings to around $12m this year, the stock is trading around 10.5x (if we back out the current $10m cash to provide an adjusted cap of $127m at $1.09) and its cashflow multiple is even lower (circa 8.5x based on c/f of $15m) providing an operating cash flow yield of about 12%. I expect the dividend to get bumped again and 6c ($7.5m) is a reasonable expectation providing a fully franked yield of 5.5% at $1.09. The company maintains a high level of franking credits and could pay out a special dividend too but I’m not banking on that.

SUMMARY


All in all, a respectable result and FSA is seeing real institutional shareholder interest for the first time, which is helping to re-rate the stock. I can see further upside.

Editors Note: Please be aware that Nigel Littlewood is not authorised to provide financial advice. The views expressed are his only. Please also note that Kristian Dibble also owns FSA. 

Tuesday, 10 September 2013

Wilson Asset Management (WAM)

This is a follow up article to the initial post Wilson Asset Management (ASX: WAM, WAMO)

In the initial article, I outlined that Listed Investment Companies (LIC) have long used options as a tool to periodically raise capital and detailed my strategy for obtaining plenty of exposure to the underlying stock with a small initial capital outlay. In the case of WAM, I noted a disconnect between the NTA and share price and strong dividend yield: at the exercise price of $1.60 the historic grossed-up dividend was 10.25%. 

The options have now expired. So how did it all work out? The post was written at the beginning of May when WAMO were 10c (I paid 8.4c) and the price moved up to 14c. The market then proceeded to get the wobbles and the price actually sank to a low of 1.8c before recovering to finish at 5.4c at expiry. Remember, options are a form of derivative and as noted in my disclosure in the initial article I noted I owned WAMO strictly as a leveraged way to buy shares in WAM. With hindsight my timing certainly could have been better. That will probably always be the case! 

Nevertheless the trade has worked out very well, albeit with plenty of luck thrown in. WAM now trade at $1.90. So all up a position initially comprising ~1% of my portfolio has led the way to an overall portfolio gain of ~2% allowing for some selling of WAM along the way. I keep underlining 'initial' because I still ended up paying $1.60 for the shares so therefore the capital was required to back up the trade. That is the beauty of keeping plenty of cash and cash equivalents handy. Obviously luck has been on my side: the market could have gone south. I took the view WAM was at least somewhat buffered from too much downside given the strong dividend and defensive positioning of its portfolio (lots of cash) and failing everything else, would have just let the options expire worthless.  

I give this idea about 6/10. The upside exposure versus dollar risk was acceptable. It won't win trade-of-the-year by a long shot, but a useful exercise regardless. I remember thinking toward the end of April that equity investors were generally getting too excited, so I genuinely think there was room for improvement in my timing on this trade (I bought WAMO near the peak of the excitement), or at least not buying the full position straightaway.  

Kristian 

Disclosure: own WAM



 


Monday, 9 September 2013

Hastings High Yield Fund (HHY)

HHY is in run-down mode. Please click herehere and here for previous posts. 

The following slides are taken from the annual results presentation:


As at 30 June, the portfolio was 'worth' $50.9m or 49.3c NTA. $13.6m is in cash. $31.1m is in Cory Environmental and Maher Terminals - both of which have another more years until maturity. The balance is made up of minor investments - including Hyne which is becoming more minor thanks to write-downs in its value. 

This compares to the current market capitalisation of $38.7m or 37.5c.

The good news is a chunk of cash is sitting on the balance sheet and should be paid out. Including the proceeds from I-Med, this amount should be around 15c per share. Another cash payment should be soon coming. 

The bad news is the timing has slipped - 2016 now looks to be the most likely finish date for this exercise and the quality of the remaining assets is difficult to get excited about.  

Hmmm. If everything does according to plan, the IRR continues to beat my investment hurdle rate. But as we know, everything may not go according to plan. In practical terms, getting comfortable with the underlying investments requires time that I can better allocate elsewhere especially considering my very minor position in the first place. 

I have sold my small stake in HHY ~ at cost. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: no position in HHY

Thursday, 5 September 2013

MacarthurCook Property Securities Fund (MPS)

As you may be aware, the vote  to replace MacarthurCook as investment manager was not successful. I have provided some thoughts in response to a readers question here.

Kristian

Disclosure: own MPS

Tuesday, 3 September 2013

RHG Ltd (RHG)

This is a follow up to my previous post on RHG. There has since been further takeover activity with the latest offer from Resimac of 49.5c being endorsed by the RHG board. RHG is currently 49c. However this post is not to speculate on the takeover activity, but to update my valuation model now the full year financials have been released.

Please note the disclaimer at the right hand side of the page. The assumptions and figures used in this post should not be taken as financial advice.  

As noted in the initial post, RHG is a mortgage book in run-down mode. In determining value, the key considerations are a) interest earned, b) interest paid, c) how fast the book is being run-down and d) overheads. I can't stress enough these are purely my estimations and could be wrong. I went back through half and full year reports in order to determine the historical figures and have updated these figures for the full year results to 30 June. The spreadsheet below shows the updated results: 


I keep a bunch of these types of spreadsheets on stocks I follow. They may not make a lot of sense: the aim for these sheets is to condense information for my own purposes, so apologies if they aren't easily read. 

The estimated % interest earned and % interest paid have come down over the last six months, consistent with decreasing interest rates in Australia. Estimated Net Interest Margin is 1.9%, which looks about right. Other expenses have stayed fairly flat from 2012 to 2013: impairment costs have increased, offsetting a general reduction in other expenses. Over time I expect overall costs to reduce as the book reduces, although impairments as a % of mortgage assets may actually increase thanks to the 'puddle getting muddier toward the bottom'. Note: impairment expenses were responsible for the jump in costs in 2010. For my projections, I am going to keep things simple: use last years interest received and paid and the long term average rate of reduction in assets, liabilities and other costs. These assumptions are probably over simplifying; however I am not trying to achieve precision, but just get a rough idea of the valuation.  

Note I have lumped cash into total assets, along with other assets and I have also lumped liabilities together. This is a bit naughty as it will slightly distort the interest received and paid, but doesn't effect the numbers too much.  

I conceptualise RHG as two components. First is the current cash balance (35c ex the recent 3c fully franked dividend and not allowing for further profits since 30 June). Second is the future profits derived from the mortgage book. Future profits will increase the cash pile further. Excluding tax and risk, it doesn't particularly matter for valuation purposes whether dividends are paid. For simplicity, I have just left future profits on the balance sheet.

Okay, based on the historical run-dow rate, the book will pretty much be exhausted by 2018. I estimate a further $44m in total NPAT will be generated. Plug in a 10% discount rate gives an upfront equivalent of 12c. Add this to the 35c and we get 47c. That's actually a bit less than the current price. 

Something doesn't seem right. 

It bothers me that 'other expenses' aren't reducing at the same rate as the book. But even plugging in a similar rate of reduction to the mortgage book only increases DCF by around 3c. Heck, even completely chopping off other expenses only increases my overall valuation to 58c. Even playing around with the run-down rate of the book doesn't bump up the DCF too much, nor does changing the discount rate. This tells me either I have made a mistake, future variables will be substantially different from historical figures or Resimac/Pepper/Cadence see a brighter future for the business than a pure-run off. 

Overall my post-tax valuation has reduced slightly from 49c (52c from my previous post less 3c dividend) to 47c. 

I previously sold some shares at 52c (pre the 3c dividend) and continue to hold a number of shares. Although there are some firm takeovers are on the table, outside of franking credits, I'm not convinced of material upside from here. 

Kristian 

Disclosure: own RHG